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Inclusive Language for Exclusive 
Policies: Restrictive Migration 
Governance in Chile, 2018
Victoria Finn  and Sebastián Umpierrez de Reguero
Contemporary liberal democracies have employed exclusive or restrictive language, 
such as promising stricter border control, to ease domestic concerns about increased 
immigration, while simultaneously maintaining inclusive outcomes by accepting 
immigrants to support labor markets or to concur with global norms. Dynamic changes 
in migration flows disrupt this exclusive–inclusive balance known as the policy gap. 
Aligned with the South American shift since 2016 to more restrictive migration measures, 
in 2018, Chile’s new administration proposed legislation to replace the migration law, 
started a regularization process, and issued two executive decrees to change nationality-
specific visa procedures. We analyze the language, timing, and implementation of the 
decrees as units of analysis, juxtaposing their apparent versus actual purposes. Since 
Chile positions restrictive measures as protective of immigrants, this case of migration 
governance inverses the policy gap debate; now, inclusive language disguises exclusive 
outcomes.
Las democracias liberales contemporáneas han empleado un lenguaje excluyente 
o restrictivo, como la promesa de un control fronterizo más estricto para calmar las 
preocupaciones nacionales por el aumento de la inmigración, al tiempo que mantienen 
resultados incluyentes al aceptar inmigrantes para apoyar los mercados laborales o estar 
de acuerdo con las normas globales. Los cambios dinámicos en los flujos migratorios 
perturban este equilibrio excluyente e incluyente conocido como ‘la brecha en la política 
migratoria’. En línea con el cambio de América del Sur hacia medidas migratorias más 
restrictivas desde 2016, en 2018, el nuevo gobierno de Chile propuso una legislación 
para reemplazar la ley de migración, inició un proceso de regularización y emitió dos 
decretos ejecutivos para cambiar los procedimientos de visa de acuerdo a la nacionalidad. 
Analizamos aquí el lenguaje, el tiempo y la implementación de los decretos como 
unidades de análisis, yuxtaponiendo sus propósitos aparentes versus los reales. Dado que 
Chile posiciona las medidas restrictivas como protectoras de los inmigrantes, este caso 
de gobernanza migratoria invierte el debate sobre la brecha política; ahora, el lenguaje 




© 2020 The Authors. Latin American Policy published by Wiley Periodicals LLC on behalf 
of Policy Studies Organisation
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 
License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the 
original work is properly cited.






Key words: restrictive migration governance, migration management, policy gap debate, executive 
decree, exclusive immigration policy, South America
“(…) the figure of ‘crisis’ has shaped or been mobilized by the techniques 
and practices of border and migration management…migration itself has 
been defined in terms of a crisis that needs to be managed…” Casas-Cortes 
et al. (2015, p. 59)
Introduction
Using exclusive language while maintaining inclusive migration policy com-
prised the policy gap debate in the 1990s literature (see Arrighi, 2014; Freeman, 
1995; Hollifield, Martin & Orrenius, 2014 [1994]; Joppke, 1998). Liberal democ-
racies promised restrictive policy, such as stricter border control, to ease voter 
concerns about increasing immigration, but policy outcomes remained overall 
expansionist. The difference between what was said and what was done is the 
policy gap. While economic globalization has increased mobility to distribute be-
tween labor markets, it does not explain expansionist outcomes; similarly, while 
global norms within the international human-rights regime have spread, they 
have not lowered states’ ability to control immigration, although capacity varies 
among countries (Freeman, 1994; Joppke, 1998).
Migration governance is a two-step organizational process in which actors first 
conceptualize how economic, political, social, demographic, and environmental 
conditions affect the social system, then seek to “steer, manage or coordinate 
these effects” (Geddes et al., 2019, p. 9). Governance considers real and perceived 
migration effects and uses various strategies to manage them. Thus, governance 
incorporates migration management, which are the actions or measures that 
states take. As the epigraph highlights, contemporary governments commonly 
face a perception of migration crisis, interpretable as a threat to national secu-
rity and sovereignty. How administrations choose to handle these perceptions 
becomes evident by examining the language, content, and implementation of 
migration policies.
As early as 2000, South American migration policies started to conform to 
a global regime of migration control, targeting especially irregular migration, 
by developing policies of control “with a human face” (Domenech, 2013). A 
regional shift to more restrictive migration management became more appar-
ent in 2016, starting with Argentina’s changed political discourse on migration 
during Mauricio Macri’s administration (Acosta, 2018, p. 23; Brumat, Acosta & 
Vera-Espinoza, 2018; Geddes et al., 2019). State actors in Argentina, Brazil, and 
Chile, for example, started to blame immigrants for a variety of social problems, 
forming a link between migration and security, to justify restrictive migration 
governance (Brumat et al., 2018).
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Yet Chile’s actions in 2018 show a peculiarity, since its migration governance 
strategy disguises restrictive measures as protective of immigrants. The clear-
est example is the repeated “safe, orderly and regular migration” in written 
documents and political discourse. The phrase stems from the International 
Organization for Migration (IOM) and is prominent in migration governance 
around the world, such as in the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular 
Migration. While it relates to protecting and including individuals, Chile—which 
did not sign the Compact—contrarily employs it while discussing more restric-
tive human mobility (Acosta et al., 2018). In effect, it inverses the migration pol-
icy gap debate; instead of using exclusive language for inclusive policy, this case 
shows inclusive language to disguise exclusive migration policy.
Balancing using executive versus legislative power, the newly elected right-
wing administration of Sebastián Piñera made various changes to Chile’s 
migration governance strategy in its first months, in 2018 (DEM, 2018). The first 
change was a longer route to propose legislation to replace the 1975 Migration 
Law (Decree N.1094, 1975), which dates from Augusto Pinochet’s dictatorship. 
The second was a faster route of issuing two executive decrees to change Haitian 
and Venezuelan visa procedures—two of the newest and fastest-growing nation-
alities within immigration flows to Chile—along with a regularization process. 
Using the faster route guaranteed action but reflects the ‘unbalanced’ part of the 
checks and balances in Latin American systems that tilts in favor of the executive 
(Acosta et al., 2019; Gargarella, 2013, p. 33).
Focusing on the two executive decrees as units of analysis, we examine their 
language, timing, and implementation within the domestic and regional migra-
tion context. We find gaps between the decrees’ apparent versus actual purposes. 
Apparent purposes are the decrees’ wording, which conveys inclusive policies 
protective of migrants; it is a façade because the policies are restrictive. Thus, 
actual purposes are more exclusive policies, as compared to the former sta-
tus quo. Policies of control “with a human face” use inclusive ideas rooted in 
human rights but achieve the same result as openly restrictive migration policies 
(Domenech, 2013); similarly, the decrees’ contrasting differences represent what 
we call paradoxical purposes.
In the following section, we contextualize the case by elaborating on Chile’s 
traditional versus emergent immigrant  waves, particularly Haitians and 
Venezuelans. We also describe the important role of the executive–legisla-
tive power balance in migration governance strategies. In a system with high 
executive power, the privilege of fast-track decree making can result in ad-hoc 
measures and repetitions of past policy mistakes. We explain the paradoxical 
purposes of Chile’s 2018 migration management measures, highlighting the 
inclusive language for exclusive policy.
Immigration and Executive Power in Chile
Globalization has affected migration governance but in a different way than 
the literature had predicted; global norms have not converted states into inter-
national human-rights regimes, nor have they destroyed states’ authority over 
migration policy making, as Soysal (1994) foresaw (Joppke, 1998). Rather, states 
continue to be capable of controlling migration and to maintain legitimacy and 
sovereignty, since they are the primary grantors of rights and membership in 
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the territory (Escobar, 2007; Freeman, 1994). States mandate who is allowed in 
(and out), under what conditions, and what individuals can do inside borders. 
As such, states affect individual-level decision making throughout the migra-
tory trajectory, both before and after the border crossing, through imposing ad-
ditional legal barriers, such as pre- and post-migration bureaucracy (Finn, 2019).
Deciding to include restrictive migration measures can lead to unintended 
consequences. For example, undocumented immigration may increase (by clan-
destine entry or visa overstayers not exiting), reflecting an inefficient answer to 
irregular migration and an apparent loss of control over ‘unwanted’ migrants 
entering or living in a territory (Domenech, 2013; Hollifield et al., 2014 [1994]; 
Mármora, 2010, p. 73). Nonetheless, in response to increased human mobility 
in the globalized world, states continue to attempt to regulate it and its effects 
through migration management. Our case of Chile’s 2018 migration governance 
strategy follows suit; facing quick changes in immigrant inflows and characteris-
tics, the state  reacted by attempting to regulate it and its perceived effects.
Chile as a Migration State
Chile is now a main immigrant-receiving country (see Figure 1), in contrast to 
its history of being an emigrant-sending country. While Chile hit a peak of 4.2% 
foreign-born residents within the total population in 1907 (INE, 1907), the coun-
try has historically been a net sending country, meaning it had more emigrants 
abroad than in-country immigrants. Many residents emigrated to seek better 
economic opportunities or to escape from political crises related to Salvador 
Allende’s government (1971–1973) or the civil-military regime of Augusto 
Pinochet (1973–1989) (Rodríguez, 1982; Soffia Contrucci, Cano Christiny, & 
Martínez Pizarro, 2009).
For more than three decades (1970–2002), immigration originated from five 
main countries—Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, and Spain (see Table 1), three 
of which share geographic borders with Chile. The percentage of foreign-born 
residents in the total population was less than 1% in the 1990s, then tripled by 
2015, and doubled again between 2015 and 2018. The result was approximately 
6.7% of immigrants within the total population in 2018, including possible 
Figure 1. Chile, From Sending to Receiving Country, 1950–2010
Source: DEM (2016); INE (2017).
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undocumented migrants (INE-DEM, 2018). During this time, Chile not only 
shifted from being an origin to a destination country but also saw various immi-
gration groups gradually emerge; some differ from previous groups in terms of 
origin country, ethnicity, and language. Chile has become a new popular desti-
nation country for Haitian and Venezuelan citizens.
The 2017 national census revealed that Colombia and Venezuela have dis-
placed Ecuador and Spain as top origin countries (see Table 2). Combining the 
traditional flow of Peruvians with the new Colombian and Venezuelan flows, 
these three groups represented 50.7% of all foreign-born residents in 2017 and 
52.6% in 2018. Haitians are also an emerging diaspora choosing Chile as a des-
tination country, despite its lengthy geographic distance and distinct language. 
Despite being a new immigrant group over the last decade, in 2018, Haitians 
already represented 14.3% of the foreign-born in Chile, surpassing by more than 
double the established traditional stock of 6.0% Argentines.
Over the last decade, immigrants from Colombia, Haiti, and Venezuela have 
internationally relocated for various reasons, and more often they are choosing 
Chile as a destination country. Our two groups of interest for the present analy-
sis are Haitians and Venezuelans. From at least 2005 to 2014, the Department of 
Foreign Affairs and Migration in Chile categorized Haitians under ‘other coun-
tries’ when calculating the foreign-born population, meaning that the proportion 
of Haitians over the total number of immigrants in Chile throughout this period 
was insignificant, irrelevant for policymaking. Similarly, Table 2 shows a dra-
matic change in migration from Venezuela; from 2005 to 2015, Venezuelans com-
prised approximately 2% of the total foreign born in Chile, while in 2018 they far 
outnumbered all other immigrant groups.
First, Haitians are selecting Chile and Brazil, rather than geographically 
closer countries, as main settlement destinations. Audebert (2017) sustains that 
Brazil and Chile are very attractive for Haitians due to the strong demand for 
work, particularly for low-cost labor in construction and manufacturing, the 
agro-food industry, and other low-skill services. Additionally, Haiti has forged 
close bilateral cooperative relations in recent years with both Brazil and Chile 
through humanitarian settings. These countries, as well as Uruguay, led active 
roles during disaster situations such as Hurricane Jeanne in 2004 and the 2010 
earthquake, and during the United Nations Mission for the Stabilization of Haiti 
(Audebert, 2017; Feldmann & Montes, 2010; Fernandes & Faria, 2017).
Second, Venezuelans have been fleeing the political and economic crisis 
under Nicolás Maduro’s administration (UNHCR, 2018b). In mid-2018, Chile 
was the second-largest receiving country of Venezuelans in Latin America, after 
Colombia (IOM-UN, 2018). Less than a year later at the beginning of 2019, Chile 
ranked third, with 288,233 Venezuelans (UNHCR-OIM, 2019). From 2017 to 2018, 
the incremental rate of Venezuelans moving to Chile was more than 200% and 
continues to grow. Practitioners and academics recognize the outflows as one of 
the largest refugee crises in world history (Brumat, 2019; Freier, 2018; Freier & 
Parent, 2018; UNHCR, 2018a, 2018b).
Executive Decrees
Since the 1990s, Chile has experienced three distinct migration policy stages, 
as Thayer (2019) outlines—the ‘default’ policy period (1992–2002), the ‘ad-hoc’ 
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policy period (2002–2017), and the ‘clean up the house’ policy period (2018–
present). President Piñera said that the 2018 migration law proposal is meant to 
“ordenar la casa,” which means to “clean up the house” (Navarrete & Vedoya, 
2019). It is impossible to ignore the overlap of the Spanish verb “ordenar” with 
the other widely used phrase of orderly (ordenada) migration. This article fits into 
the most recent ‘clean up the house’ policy period, which relates to using execu-
tive power to directly do the ‘cleaning’.
In presidential systems, particularly in Latin America, governments can use 
executive decrees as a tool of pressure and defense toward the legislature and its 
seat distribution (Carey & Shugart, 1998; Palanza, 2019). According to Cox and 
Morgenstern (2002), when the executive has a minimum winning coalition in the 
legislature, he or she tends to pass initiatives through it to promote new laws 
or amend existing ones. Contrarily, when the legislature represents a credible 
threat for the executive, the latter must opt for a conciliatory attitude, keeping 
constituents in mind if he or she desires reelection. To govern and promote an 
agenda, the executive uses decree authority. Since executive decrees can be put 
into action quickly, they are a mechanism of modifying or amending laws in 
Chile without necessarily having to obtain legislative approval (Constitution of 
Chile, 1980, Art. 71; Siavelis, 2001). Although decrees are within a democratic 
framework since they are constitutional, using decree authority can also give 
the impression that the executive is strategically avoiding veto players, such as 
the legislature or constitutional court, who would want to modify or reject the 
initiative. Moreover, using inclusive language throughout the decrees also gives 
the impression of expansionist policy.
Executive decrees are not the only successful tool that Chilean governments 
use to change laws or regulations. Since the 1990s, the president’s party has 
governed without an absolute majority (50% + 1) in the legislature (including 
the lower and upper chambers)—except during President Bachelet’s first and 
second terms (2006–2010, 2014–2018). Therefore, changing legislature within 
the rigid “iron cage” remaining from the democratic transition has not been an 
easy path, although some governments from the center-left coalition Concertación 
were able to make substantive changes from 1990 to 2006 (Fuentes, 2016; Siavelis, 
2001; Toro Maureira, 2007). Success in these cases came from executive–legis-
lative negotiations and presidential control over the urgency level. Both tech-
niques can help promote initiatives that the executive or another state legislative 
branch proposes.
Through the urgencies resource, the president can drastically change the leg-
islative agenda but not necessarily gain legislative approval. The executive can 
modify the agenda by opting for the label of ‘urgency’ (simple urgencia), ‘import-
ant urgency’ (suma urgencia), or for ‘immediate discussion’ (discusión inmediata). 
This means that within 30, 10, or 3 days, respectively, Congress must resolve, 
debate, or vote (or a combination of these actions) on the law or amendment 
that the executive or other state branch has proposed (Constitution of Chile, 
1980, Art. 71; Siavelis, 2001). Under this framework, we consider why President 
Piñera resorted to combining the decree authority with an executive–legisla-
tive initiative requiring the legislature’s approval, especially given the ability to 
accelerate the congressional process. Piñera proposed regulating migration with 
a top-down approach to change the current Migration Law from 1975; although 
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it has modifications, the law’s main structure remains intact. The previous 
administration of Michelle Bachelet attempted to change it and failed, as Piñera 
had also done in 2013 during his first administration (see Thayer, 2019). Since 
2013, attempts at executive–legislative bargaining have also failed to modify the 
Migration Law’s status quo (Jarufe Bader, 2019).
To understand the possible scenarios that the administration faced in 2018, 
we propose a decision game (Figure 2), relating to compliance and executive–
legislative bargaining, in which the executive faced at least four scenarios. (1) 
If Piñera had not applied decrees or used executive–legislative initiatives, the 
probability is higher that voters would have lowered their approval of Piñera’s 
administration, with no effect on the legislature; (2) if Piñera had used only 
decree authority, his voters could have increased or maintained their approval 
of him, but it would have damaged future cooperation between the executive 
and legislature because the ruling coalition did not have a legislative majority 
(in Congress or the Senate), meaning the deputies and senators would have had 
to compromise their initiatives to gain the opposition’s approval; (3) if Piñera 
had used only an executive–legislative initiative, the legislature would have 
had the final decision-making power, and could have approved, modified, or 
rejected the migration proposal. Rejection had occurred in the past. Regardless 
of the attempt, legislature rejection would have meant decreased voter approval 
of the president, and perhaps of the Minister of the Interior, but the legislature 
would have gained leverage over the executive, increasing the chances of future 
bargaining; (4) if Piñera had applied both decree authority and a legislative 
Figure 2. Executive–Legislative Bargaining Spatial Model, Chile’s Migration Governance, 2018
Source: Authors’ elaboration.
Notes: Sq = status quo; B = represents a zero-sum game, in which one side of the players wins 
everything; and C = represents a win–win subset in which cooperation between the two players is 
possible.
 Restrictive Migration Governance 51
initiative, voters could have maintained, or even increased support for the presi-
dent and his cabinet. At the same time, going through the legislature would have 
increased cooperation between the two branches.
Considering the four scenarios, the last is a win–win negotiation in terms of 
compliance and executive–legislative cooperation. It was this path that Piñera 
took, since the administration put forth a new Migration Law proposal to 
Congress and at the same time implemented two migration-related executive 
decrees, along with a regularization process. The decrees took immediate effect 
in April 2018; regularization was intended to occur from July 2018 to July 2019, 
but was extended and ended in late October 2019; the legislative project is still in 
progress, as of March 2020.
Choosing to use executive, rather than legislative, power for direct migration 
management is worrisome since executive-led migration measures throughout 
the region lie on the legal borderline, with little or no parliamentary interven-
tion (Brumat et al., 2018). Some of these measures also leave ample space for 
discretion. For example, in the regularization process outline, Chile reserves the 
right for the Subsecretary of the Interior to determine whether a migrant’s doc-
uments meet the requirements (DEM, 2018, p. 6). There is discrepancy between 
the required documents for registration and determining if the applicant has 
committed immoral acts or is a known instigator or activist of violent doctrines, 
for which the government uses discretion to offer or revoke visas.
Paradoxical Purposes
In 2018, the executive decisions in Chile were a response to changing immi-
gration inflows and undocumented migration. This response took the form of a 
more restrictive migration governance strategy, which disguises targeted exclu-
sionary policies as a migrant-protection approach. The most inclusive approach 
would declare individuals’ right to migrate, whereas the Chilean government 
has made a distinction between the right to migrate and migrants’ rights, as the 
Subsecretary of the Interior reiterated while the administration introduced the 
decrees and regularization process.1  While South America has shown gaps be-
tween rhetoric and policy, and between policy and practice (Acosta & Freier, 
2015), we find different policy gaps in 2018.
In this section, we highlight the differences in what the migration policy’s pur-
pose appears to accomplish versus what the purpose actually is. The apparent 
purpose is the wording of the migration-management measure, which creates 
the façade of inclusiveness and protection of migrants. Under closer scrutiny of 
the policies’ content and implementation, the actual purpose of exclusiveness 
emerges. Since the actual purposes of the decrees clash with the stated inten-
tions, we report paradoxical purposes in Chile’s 2018 migration governance. The 
actual purposes reflect the South American shift toward more restrictiveness.
Regularization
In full-fledged migration management mode, Chile implemented an “extraor-
dinary regularization,” changed the visa procedure for Haitians, and introduced 
a special Venezuelan visa. Starting with the first, large-scale regularization pro-
cesses occurred in Chile in 1998, granting approximately 44,000 visas, and then 
again in 2007, granting some 47,000 visas (Thayer, 2019); therefore, the 2018 
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regularization is not “extraordinary” but rather fits a pattern of regularizing 
irregular migrants in Chile approximately every 10 years. The process in 2018 
comprises two phases—registration then regularization (DEM, 2019). The pri-
mary step in between was obtaining a criminal record report from the origin 
country; those able to prove they had not committed a crime in the origin coun-
try could receive a temporary visa valid for one year, whereas those failing to 
do so would be deported (DEM, 2018, p. 6).2  In the first month of regularization, 
64% of Dominican residents in Chile (some 6,200 individuals) registered (Thayer, 
2019). This high percentage of irregularity within one nationality group is part 
of the lagged effect that the 2012 Dominican visa creation had on irregular mi-
gration in Chile. Throughout the first period from April to July 2018, 155,000 
individuals registered, but after a year of implementation, only approximately 
30% of those estimated to be in an irregular situation have managed to obtain a 
visa (DEM, 2019; Navarrete & Vedoya, 2019).3 
Unlike the decrees that target nationalities, the regularization process was 
intended for all ‘irregular’ migrants, meaning those who never had documents 
(who entered clandestinely), have expired documents (such as visa overstayers), 
or lack adequate documents.4  The apparent purpose was to regularize immi-
grants, meaning granting legal status to those lacking or with expired doc-
uments. The measure was part of the migration governance strategy since it 
demonstrates that the government is attempting to manage irregular migration’s 
perceived effects on the country. In other words, regularization aims to resolve 
the lingering effects of previous restrictive policy since it backtracks to rectify 
scenarios in which migrants failed to comply with burdensome pre- or post-mi-
gration bureaucracy steps (Finn, 2019).
The language and outcome of this migratory policy differ. The apparent pur-
pose is to combat irregular migration and suppress illicit transborder activities 
such as human trafficking and clandestine entry—in short, “to achieve safe, 
orderly and regular migration” (DEM, 2018, p. 5). Chile claims its right as a state 
to do so; in exchange, it claims to mitigate risks associated with human mobility 
and guarantees migrants’ fundamental rights.5  The language is about protect-
ing migrants, legalizing irregular migrants’ statuses, and bringing them out of 
a potentially precarious situation. Contrarily, the first phase of the process was 
registering migrants—meaning collecting data on individuals, including chil-
dren, with expired or no documents—to conduct and gather background checks 
and deport those who fail to meet requirements. Deportation can safely count as 
exclusionary, so the regularization process is a brief example of how Chile’s 2018 
migration governance strategy used inclusive language with exclusive policies.
Haitians: From State Cooperation to Retrenchment
The visa procedure for Haitians entering Chile was introduced on April 9, 
2018 (Decree N.776).
• Apparent: “safe, orderly and regular migration” to protect potential Haitian 
migrants as well as Haitian residents in Chile
• Actual: targeting just one nationality, despite an uptick in other immigration 
inflows
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Chile recognizes a legitimate state right to control the entry and residence 
within its territory, as well as a self-assigned role to “guarantee migrants’ fun-
damental rights” (DEM, 2018, p. 1). After controlling human mobility into and 
within the state, the government says that it will not only protect the rights of 
those residing in Chile but also help migrants integrate (DEM, 2018, p. 1). This as-
sistance is intended for ‘regular’ (documented) Constitution-obliging migrants; 
in parallel, there is a ‘heavy-handed’ (mano dura) approach against human traf-
fickers and against irregular and clandestine entry (DEM, 2018, p. 2). Conversely, 
in the same document the Department of Foreign Affairs and Migration says that it 
will not criminalize irregular residency since irregular migration, in itself, does 
not constitute a crime (“la migración irregular no es, por sí misma, constitutiva 
de delito”) (DEM, 2018, p. 3).
As part of the response to controlling entry and exit, Chile created two new 
procedures. First, Chile introduced a tourist visa (Visado Consular de Turismo 
Simple) specifically for Haitians. Requirements to obtain it include copies of 
bank statements showing at least U.S.$60 per day during the stay in Chile, a 
valid hotel reservation or an invitation letter (notarized in the Chilean Consulate 
in Port-au-Prince, Haiti), and a legalized criminal background check issued in 
Haiti (Ministry of Foreign Relations, 2020). Second, Chile established a volun-
tary return program, available to both documented and undocumented Haitian 
migrants residing in Chile. As of April 2019, the Chilean government reported 
that 1,262 Haitians had returned to Haiti via this program (Ministry of the 
Interior & Public Security, 2019). It again employs globally accepted wording, 
calling it the ‘Humanitarian Plan of Orderly Return’ (Plan Humanitario de Retorno 
Ordenado), when we are unsure if it is humanitarian or to what extent it is volun-
tary. The IOM (2019) backs this program, stating that assisted voluntary return 
provides a “more humane and efficient alternative to forced return” (meaning as 
compared to deportation) and is an “indispensable element of a global perspec-
tive of migration governance.”
There are ordered points within the Decree (N.776), starting with the first 
point of “orderly, safe, and regular migration” being a national interest. It then 
highlights a large increase of Haitians entering Chile as tourists, but who stay 
and become irregular migrants. Yet entering as a tourist and later requesting 
a different visa while already in Chile follows the current migration law and 
its regulation (Decree N.1094, 1975; Decree N.597, 1984). In other words, prior 
to the present migration reform proposal, tourist entry had been the standard 
legal procedure to obtain another visa. This point leads to the third, which says 
that remaining in Chile once a tourist visa expires makes the migrant ‘irregular,’ 
putting migrants and their families at risk of human trafficking and other dangers 
related to being irregular. Here, there is a large jump from a visa overstayer to 
a risk of being trafficked once residing in Chile. This lack of logical succession 
between points aids in moving toward the decree’s exclusionary purpose. Given 
these circumstances, as the Decree proposes, migration management is needed 
to protect migrants who already reside in the country. Protection is the inclusive 
language disguising the actual purpose of lowering the number of this particular 
nationality entering Chile as a destination country.
In addition to this tourist visa, Chile also issued another visa for Haitians, a 
Humanitarian Visa for Family Reunification (Visado Humanitario de Reunificación 
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Familiar), 10,000 of which are available annually (DEM, 2018, p. 5). Comparatively, 
more than 100,000 Haitians arrived in Chile between 2017 and 2018 (see Table 2). 
This visa states that it is intended for family reunification, yet its duration is 
12 months, renewable only once (DEM, 2018, p. 5). It is unclear what will occur 
after these two years. This period is very short for separated spouses or for minors 
separated from their parents residing in Chile; in other words, it seems unfit for 
the two target groups, being ‘humanitarian’ only in name. It also has a restrictive 
outcome, given the number limit on visas. We interpret that its actual purpose 
is to encourage Haitians residing in Chile without their families to return to the 
origin country rather than bring their family to Chile.
Since migration governance conceptualizes the effects of new social changes 
and then tries to manage these effects (Geddes et al., 2019), in this case, Chile 
has reacted to upticks in diverse migratory flows through more exclusionary 
practices targeting only certain nationalities. This strategy mirrors a past pol-
icy mistake; Chile had issued a similar visa in 2012, targeting just those from 
the Dominican Republic, which failed. Instead of reducing immigration, there 
was evidence that the visa deregulated migration, generating human traffick-
ing, irregular entry, and formal labor market exclusion (Acosta et al., 2018; Rojas 
Pedemonte & Dittborn, 2016; Thayer, 2019).
The approach is hidden behind a veil meant to protect migrants and their 
families. Chile presents these decisions in parallel to “safe, orderly and regular 
migration.” Despite this repeated phrase encapsulating an international norm, 
Chile is using it to support exclusionary rather than inclusionary migration pol-
icy (Acosta et al., 2018). To respond to changes in the global arena, “govern-
ments have devised a number of ways to circumvent normative constraints” 
(Guiraudon & Lahav, 2000, p. 164). In this case, Chile is using a globally accepted 
phrase to circumvent criticism on restrictive policy. In other words, we again 
find inclusive language used to achieve exclusive outcomes.
These actions ripple through distinct levels of cooperation; the national-level 
policy reflects global-level rhetoric, affecting state-to-state relations with Haiti. 
Chile previously sent post-disaster specialized seismic knowledge to Haiti, 
demonstrating the building of expansionist state ties between the two countries. 
The international assistance opened a new geographic route for individuals 
to migrate to Chile, but when immigration inflows increased, Chile chose an 
approach to lower the number of immigrants from one particular country, result-
ing in Decree N.776. This relation portrays a shift from state-to-state migration 
cooperation to retrenchment.
Venezuelans: Reciprocal Democratic Gesture or Choosing Desirable 
Migrants?
A new visa for Venezuelans migrating to Chile was introduced on April 9, 
2018, and took effect on April 16, 2018 (DEM, 2018, p. 5; Oficio Circular N.96, 
2018).
• Apparent: it is democratic to accept migration caused by an undemocratic 
country
• Actual: pre-migration bureaucracy reduces the number of individuals mov-
ing to Chile
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Havoc in the Venezuelan economy, including hyperinflation and a shortage of 
basic goods and services, resulted in the emigration of approximately 3.4 million 
people from 2015 to 2018, many to survive, avoid starvation, or obtain medicine 
(Acosta, Blouin & Freier, 2019; Freier & Parent, 2018; UNHCR, 2018a). Although 
Venezuelans had mainly been economic migrants, many meet refugee status, fol-
lowing the 1984 Cartagena Declaration’s definition; accordingly, asylum-seeker 
applications rose from less than 4,000 in 2014 to some 342,000 in 2018 (UNHCR, 
2018b). The migration outflows from Venezuela comprise one of the largest dis-
placement crises worldwide, with Colombia as the leading destination country 
for Venezuelan displaced persons and asylum seekers (approximately 1.17 mil-
lion), followed by Chile (288,000), and Ecuador (262,000) (UNHCR, 2018a, p. 25). 
Yet South American states choose not to recognize an overall refugee status for 
Venezuelans, with the recent exception of Brazil (Acosta et al., 2019; Brumat, 
2019; Freier, 2018). Considering the Cartagena Declaration, Brazil implemented 
a fast-track legal route in December 2019 based on prima facie recognition, for 
Venezuelans as a group to gain refugee status (Acosta & Madrid, 2020).
Instead, some states such as Chile, Colombia, Paraguay, and Peru have 
implemented ad-hoc policies and imposed visas for Venezuelans, as have most 
recently Bolivia and Ecuador (Acosta & Madrid, 2020); thus “reactions to the 
resulting migration crisis can best be described as ad-hoc measures” (Freier & 
Parent, 2018). Peru offers a Temporary Stay Permit but is backlogged in process-
ing applications; Colombia has a Special Stay Permit for Venezuelans, although 
the country retrenched, issuing Border Mobility Cards (Freier & Parent, 2018). 
Ecuador implemented a visa requirement for Venezuelans, which is unlawful 
since it goes against its own 2017 Human Mobility Law (Brumat et al., 2018). As 
of August 2019, Ecuador is offering two new types of visas, a temporary human-
itarian visa for Venezuelans already residing in Ecuador (who are free of crimi-
nal infractions) and another for Venezuelans wishing to emigrate (Decree N.826, 
2019). Chile is not an exception in offering its own ad-hoc measure, issuing a 
Visa of Democratic Responsibility (Visa de Responsabilidad Democrática) (Oficio 
Circular N.96, 2018).
These types of reactions and adjustments clash with (albeit weakened) 
regional aims. Restrictiveness contradicts the overall South American stance on 
the right to migrate and a human-rights approach to migration, as exemplified in 
the Mercosur Residence Agreement that supports free mobility throughout the 
region and the signed (non-binding) agreements at the annual South American 
Conference on Migration (e.g., Acosta & Finn, 2019; Brumat et al., 2018; Finn et 
al., 2019). Some neighbor countries, such as Argentina and Uruguay, have cho-
sen to extend the Mercosur Residence Agreement to Venezuelans, as has Brazil, 
reflected in its new two-year temporary residency visa for Venezuelans (Acosta 
& Madrid, 2020).
When the Chilean government created the visa, individuals could apply for 
it only at the Chilean consulate in Puerto Ordaz or Caracas, Venezuela. As of 
June 24, 2019, Venezuelans are able to apply at any Chilean consulate in any 
country, but the application requires a criminal background check issued from a 
Venezuelan ministry, along with a passport issued in 2013 or later, a photo, and 
U.S.$30. If individuals apply from a third country, they must also submit a crim-
inal background check from that country.6  By the end of 2018, approximately 
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94,000 Venezuelans had applied for this visa, but only 20% had received their 
visa, and 55% were still processing; the remaining 25% applied without hav-
ing the required document of a criminal background check, so the Chilean gov-
ernment rejected these applications of 22,000 individuals (Navarrete & Vedoya, 
2019).
On the same day the government announced the new visa, the Subsecretary 
of Foreign Affairs issued a memo to all Chilean consulates abroad, stating that 
the democratic crisis in Venezuela has resulted in a “mass exodus.” It states that 
the reason this visa was introduced is that “Exoduses of this kind tend to pro-
voke vulnerabilities regarding fundamental [human] rights, increase human 
trafficking, and [increase] illegal migrant trafficking.”7  This statement implies 
a migrant-state relation since the visa is intended to protect Venezuelans. While 
outlining the migration reform, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Migration 
writes that the reason is the “democratic crisis” occurring in Venezuela (DEM, 
2018, p. 5).8  This statement contrarily implies state-to-state relations, since the visa 
juxtaposes Chile as democratic, opposed to Venezuela as in a democratic crisis. 
Moreover, the DEM explicitly parallels the similarity between the past and pres-
ent since many Chileans had previously “sought refuge” in Venezuela, referring 
to Chilean emigration in the 1970s during economic and political crises.
Called a visa of ‘democratic responsibility,’ the wording is a regional sign to 
the Venezuelan government that Chile is democratic, whereas Venezuela is not. 
In the international realm, it signals that Chile is actively responding to increas-
ing outflows from the country. Yet this phrase stirs a different question—is it 
democratically responsible to create a visa process, where one had previously 
been absent, for individuals within the region who are fleeing a failing state? 
This normative question asks countries to decide if they are responding to flows 
of economic migrants or refugees. The migration measures, whether normatively 
appropriate or not, use inclusive language in exclusive policies.
State requirements for potential immigrants to obtain certain documents or 
take administrative steps to gain admission to the territory comprise pre-migra-
tion bureaucracy (Finn, 2019). Sovereign states have control over individuals’ 
entry to and exit from the territory, as well as the rights they enjoy while visiting 
or residing in the country. When states implement additional pre- or post-mi-
gration bureaucracy requirements, it becomes more difficult to gain access to 
enter or ‘legally’ reside in the territory (Finn, 2019). These requirements could (1) 
disincentivize potential migrants from choosing it as a destination country, or (2) 
be too difficult or time consuming to obtain, in turn increasing undocumented 
migrants.
If requirements are too cumbersome, fewer individuals may move to the ter-
ritory, and the state would effectively shrink the size of the immigration inflow, 
achieving the desired restrictive outcome. Contrarily, in the second scenario, 
additional migration bureaucracy can result in a higher number of undocu-
mented immigrants since potential migrants may enter clandestinely and res-
idents overstay their visa, in turn becoming undocumented. It is a possible 
unintended consequence of restrictiveness. The public-policy irony is that regu-
larization is an attempt to rectify the prior decision of requiring additional pre- 
or post-migration bureaucracy. In other words, after a restrictive policy increases 
the number of undocumented immigrants, regularizing them can overcome this 
policy failure but requires the state to use more post-migration bureaucracy.
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Based on the process of Venezuelans obtaining the visa, we interpret the 
decree as part of Chile’s migration  governance strategy, using inclusive lan-
guage in restrictive policy. The visa appears to lend a helping hand in accepting 
immigrants; by name, it is ‘democratic,’ trying to lead by example at both the 
regional and broader international levels. A more democratic step would be to 
extend Mercosur Residence Agreement or recognize refugee status. We inter-
pret that the actual purpose of increasing pre-migration bureaucracy (requiring a 
visa and a criminal background check issued by the undemocratic country from 
which the individual is trying to emigrate) is an attempt to reduce the number of 
Venezuelans choosing Chile as a destination country.
The Haitian- and Venezuelan-specific visas demonstrate changed state-to-
state relations. In the first, we find state cooperation to retrenchment, moving 
from Chilean seismic assistance in the aftermath of the earthquake in Haiti—fol-
lowed by a large increase in Haitian migration to Chile—to a retrenchment-style 
targeted visa to reduce Haitian immigration. In the second, the “democratic 
responsibility” visa seeks to assist Venezuelans leaving in mass numbers due 
to the state’s democratic crisis, even highlighting the fact that Venezuelans had 
done the same decades before for Chileans during economic and political crises. 
Yet we interpret both visas as pre-migration bureaucracy that the administration 
uses as signals in an attempt to deter potential immigrants from entering the 
territory.
Conclusion
Chile’s 2018 executive-driven migration governance strategy stands out for 
its inclusive language disguising exclusive migration policy, which reverses 
the policy gap debate from the 1990s. Whereas exclusive discourse previously 
paralleled inclusive migration policy, now inclusionary language is employed 
to support exclusionary policy. Carefully chosen and repetitive terms such as 
“democratic responsibility” in the Venezuelan visa are a calculated part of this 
strategy. While the terminology appears to offer refuge, visa implementation cre-
ates a pre-migration bureaucratic step attempting to deter potential migrants. 
At the state level, the fluidness between inclusivity and exclusivity fluctuates 
between cooperation via more open policies during good times and more restric-
tive policies against ‘undesirable’ or ‘unwanted’ immigrants during bad times.
More exclusive migration policy has future repercussions, particularly for 
irregular migration and then regularization. The 2018 “extraordinary regular-
ization” was not extraordinary, since it follows Chile’s large-scale 1998 and 2007 
regularizations, making it more of a once-a-decade event. The process shows 
those at home and abroad that Chile is taking action to solve a perceived prob-
lem of irregular immigration, to which (ironically) its own pre- and post-mi-
gration bureaucracy, such as the previous Dominican visa, had contributed. In 
discourse and in writing, the government repeats the commonly accepted phrase 
of “safe, orderly and regular migration” to disguise the strategy as one protect-
ing migrants, meshing well with regional stances and accords. Yet Chile decided 
not to sign the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration in 2018. 
The government repeatedly refers to more-restrictive migration measures and 
aims for the low-hanging fruit of irregular immigration, positioning the regular-
ization process as an effort to “clean up the house.”
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Although these migration governance strategies fit within the regional shift 
to more restrictiveness since 2016, they clash with a previous recognition that 
restrictive migration policies can produce ineffective results, including increas-
ing the number of undocumented migrants. Restrictiveness also contrasts with 
previous South American support for more open borders, human mobility rights, 
and regional integration. Neighbors such as Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay 
have incorporated the Mercosur Resident Agreement into managing Venezuelan 
migration, and Brazil has also used the Cartagena Declaration for recognizing 
Venezuelans as refugees. We encourage future research to evaluate issue saliency 
in executive–legislative relations and the varying effects of ad-hoc and retrench-
ment policies that could have long-term effects at the national, international, and 
regional levels.
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Notes
 1Quoting the Subsecretary of the Interior, Rodrigo Ubilla, “No confundamos la migración 
como un derecho, al derecho de los migrantes, porque eso es distinto, eso está reconocido en nuestra 
propuesta legislativa” [Let us not confuse migration as a right with migrants’ right[s] because that 
[the latter] is different and that is recognized in our proposed legislature] (Catena & Labra, 2018, 
authors’ translation).
 2Also facing possible deportation were (a) violent extremists, (b) those trafficking drugs, 
weapons, contraband, and persons, (c) those lacking morals and good behavior, (d) those who had 
committed a crime in Chile, (e) previously deported persons from Chile or any other country, (f) 
irregular migrants who fail to register during the regularization process, and (g) those who used fal-
sified or someone else’s documents (DEM, 2018, p. 6, authors’ translation). Additionally, by country 
of origin, Haitians and Venezuelans represented less than 1% each of deported individuals from 2005 
to 2015, since it was before the larger migration waves began from these countries.
 3DEM (2019) reports that of the approximate 155,000 applicants (of an estimated 300,000 
persons in an irregular situation), the government has authorized 131,500 temporary visas, which 
85,000 individuals have so far received; 28,000 applicants have not re-contacted DEM to receive the 
visa; 9,000 have made appointments to get the visa; 5,000 are still awaiting their criminal background 
check from the origin country of either Haiti or the Dominican Republic; and 4,000 have left the 
country (Navarrete & Vedoya, 2019).
 4Persons in the first category of irregular entry had 30 days to register and apply for a 
temporary visa. Persons who had 90 days to register include those who had overstayed a tourist or 
residency visa, persons working in Chile without legal permission, and applicants whose visa was 
still being processed (DEM, 2018, pp. 5–6).
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 5The original text reads, “… el legítimo derecho del Estado de normar la forma en que los 
extranjeros ingresan y permanecen en el país, con el debido respeto y garantía de sus derechos fun-
damentales y la mitigación de los riesgos asociados con el movimiento de personas, para así reducir 
la migración irregular y reprimir las actividades transfronterizas ilícitas. Es decir, para lograr una 
migración ordenada, segura y regular” (DEM, 2018, p. 5).
 6The Venezuelan criminal background check must be issued within the last 90 days, and 
the other background check, when required, 60 days (Ministry of Foreign Relations, 2019).
 7The original text reads, “(…) en consideración a la crisis democrática por la que actual-
mente atraviesa la República Bolivariana de Venezuela, se ha producido un éxodo masivo de nacio-
nales de ese país… Los éxodos de esta naturaleza, tienden a provocar vulneraciones de derechos 
fundamentales, aumento de la trata de personas y tráfico ilícito de migrantes, razón por la cual, se ha 
adoptado la decisión de otorgar (…) un Visado Responsabilidad Democrática” (Oficio Circular N.96, 
2018, emphasis added).
 8The original text reads, “Venezuela: En razón de la crisis democrática por la que actual-
mente atraviesa Venezuela, y que afecta gravemente a los nacionales de un país que acogió a muchos 
chilenos que buscaban refugio en sus fronteras, se crea una Visa de Responsabilidad Democrática 
(…) solicitada ante la autoridad consular chilena en Venezuela” (DEM, 2018, p. 5).
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